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ABSTRACT
Many government-sponsored applied research, 
development, demonstration and incentive programs 
are specifically undertaken to develop technology or 
create an environment that will lead to commercial 
ventures which will be in the public interest. The 
current Administration's emphasis on commerciali­ 
zation has brought to the forefront joint endeavor or 
government/industry cooperative agreements and 
proposals for divesting operational capabilities to 
the private sector. The common thread between all 
these activities is the need for government agencies 
to plan and evaluate the private sector business 
ventures that may result. In the case of the joint 
endeavor agreements and divestiture situations, the 
evaluation of private sector business ventures is 
necessary to establish government negotiating posi­ 
tions.
This paper briefly summarizes private sector finan­ 
cial performance measures and shows how govern­ 
ment actions can affect private sector investment 
decisions through a reduction in perceived risk and 
shifting the burden of funding from the private sec­ 
tor to the public sector. Data is presented that 
illustrates the functional relationship betwen likeli­ 
hood of investment and expected return on invest­ 
ment, risk, payback period and exposure. Finally, 
the required public sector financial analysis in sup­ 
port of joint endeavor agreements and divestiture 
situations is examined. Many questions and issues 
are raised with general procedures developed to 
answer a number of these.
INTRODUCTION
Many government-sponsored applied research, de­ 
velopment, demonstration and incentive programs 
are specifically undertaken to develop technology or 
create an environment that will lead to commercial 
ventures which will be in the public interest. For 
example, much of the Department of Energy (DOE) 
effort is aimed at encouraging commercialization. 
Commercialization of new energy technologies is an 
important federal goal. Early NASA communication
satellite RD&D efforts also had such a purpose and 
led to the formation of the COMSAT Corporation 
and ultimately to a broad range of communication 
services provided by such companies as RCA, 
Western Union, AT&T and Satellite Business Sys­ 
tems. The Department of Transportation under­ 
takes RD&D and other efforts to influence maritime 
related investment decisions. For example, pro­ 
grams are currently underway that seek to influence 
private sector investment decisions pertaining to 
new coal ports [1]. In addition, policies have been 
developed to provide tax credits as incentives to 
make energy conservation investments and to en­ 
courage business to invest in plant and equipment.
NASA's current space station efforts are also aimed 
at the private sector (as well as the public sector). 
The space station will permit entry of the private 
sector into space by providing a rnicrogravity facili­ 
ty for developing and then manufacturing com­ 
mercial products. Therefore the benefits to be 
derived from the development and use of the space 
station will, to a certain extent, depend upon pri­ 
vate sector utilization of the space station. Other 
NASA efforts aimed at commercialization include 
the mobile [2] and 30/20 GHz [3] communication 
satellite programs. Both of these are demonstration 
programs aimed at influencing private sector invest­ 
ment or commercialization decisions through re­ 
duction of perceived risk and shifting some of the 
burden of funding from the private to the public 
sector. The planning of such development and 
demonstration programs requires that the public 
sector plan and evaluate private sector business 
ventures in order to assess the effect of these 
programs on private sector investment decisions.
The current Administration's emphasis on com­ 
mercialization has brought to the forefront joint 
endeavor or government/industry cooperative agree­ 
ments. These include NASA/industry cooperative 
space processing endeavors [4] and low earth orbit 
platform endeavors [5]. There has also been an 
ever increasing number of divestiture proposals 
from both the public and private sectors. These 
include NOAA's efforts to commercialize the 
LANDSAT and meteorological satellites [6,7], the
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Space Transportation Company's [8] efforts to 
commercialize the Space Shuttle, and various pro­ 
posals to commercialize the fleets of expendable 
launch vehicles. Commercialization through joint 
endeavor agreements or divestiture of government 
operations or assets requires negotiating with the 
private sector. In order for the public sector to 
establish its negotiating positions it is necessary 
that the public sector plan and evaluate private 
sector business ventures and understand private 
sector decision processes.
When government programs are undertaken with the 
specific intent of developing technology or creating 
an environment that will lead to commercial ven­ 
tures, the desired benefits will not result unless 
private sector investment in business ventures re­ 
sults. Under these conditions it is necessay for the 
public sector to plan and evaluate private sector 
business ventures so that the specific impact of the 
government programs on investment decisions can 
be assessed. For programs aimed at influencing 
private sector investment decisions, there can be no 
benefits unless private sector investment decisions 
are altered as a result of the public sector pro­ 
grams. This paper deals with such situations and 
illustrates how the public sector can explicitly take 
into account in its benefit-cost analysis the likely 
effect that its programs and policies will have on 
private sector investment decisions. In so doing, the 
public sector can identify programs and policies that 
are more likely to achieve desired goals.
It is argued that the public sector can influence 
private sector investment decisions through a re­ 
duction in private sector perceived risk and/or 
shifting the burden of funding from the private to 
the public sector. Since risk reduction has a major 
effect on investment decisions, it is necessary to 
perform financial risk analyses. Risk analysis tech­ 
niques are therefore described. Data is presented 
which shows that the likelihood of private sector 
investment is a function of expected return on 
investment, variability or standard deviation of re­ 
turn on investment, expected payback period and 
expected maximum exposure. Thus the impact of 
government programs and policies must be devel­ 
oped in terms of these variabiles so that the con­ 
sequences can be assessed in terms of changes in the 
likelihood of private sector investments. Public 
sector benefits are directly related to the change in 
investment likelihood that is the result of the public 
sector programs or policies.
Finally, joint endeavors or cooperative govern­ 
ment/industry agreements and divestiture situations 
are discussed. A number of issues are raised and it 
is argued that it is necessary for the public sector to 
plan and evaluate private sector business ventures in 
order to formulate negotiating positions that will 
achieve desired objectives.
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL AND RISK ANALYSIS
Before embarking on a discourse of public/private 
sector interactions, it is necessary to have a clear 
understanding of several financial performance 
measures that are important in private sector de­ 
cisions. After-tax profit is the difference between 
revenues and expenses and less taxes. The taxes are 
a function of revenues and expenses, carry-forward 
losses and investment and other tax credits. Capital 
expenditures are not explicitly included in the profit 
computation, but occur indirectly (and in any one 
year only partially) through the depreciation ex­ 
pense. Depreciation is an allowed expense which 
accounts for the wearing out of capital assets. Cash 
flow indicates the flow of funds through the business 
venture. The cash flow computation includes the 
magnitude and timing of the inflow and outflow of 
funds. It includes such measures as after-tax profit, 
depreciation, capital expenditures and the change in 
balance sheet items such as accounts receivable, 
accounts payable and inventory. Indebtedness is 
defined as the negative of the cumulative cash flow 
to any point in time. When indebtedness is positive, 
cash outflows have exceeded cash inflows and the 
total investment has not been recovered. When 
indebtedness is negative, the cumulative cash inflow 
exceeds the cumulative cash outflow. The peak of 
the indebtedness curve indicates the maximum fund­ 
ing requirement of the business venture. The point 
in time at which the indebtedness passes through 
zero is the payback period and indicates the time it 
takes to recoup the investment. These definitions 
are illustrated in Figure 1. Figure 2 illustrates 
simplified profit and cash flow computational pro­ 
cedures.
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The present value (PV) of a business venture is the 
summation of the stream of cash flows discounted 
to the present according to
T- Cash Flow+
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FIGURE 2 SIMPLIFIED PROFIT AND CASH FLOW COMPUTATIONAL PROCEDURE
where r is the discount rate or cost of capital. The 
return on investment, ROI, is the value of the 
discount rate that yields a present value of zero. In 
other words, the ROI is the rate of return at which 
the time adjusted value of cash outflows is equal to 
the time adjusted value of cash inflows. If the ROI 
exceeds the cost of capital it is desirable to pursue 
the business venture. Frequently, a threshold or 
cutoff rate of return or hurdle is established above 
the cost of capital. This hurdle rate, which must be 
exceeded by the venture's ROI, is a typical approach 
used to "compensate" for risk.
The evaluation and planning of new business ven­ 
tures by the private sector is concerned with deter­ 
mining sales potential, profit potential, required 
investment (exposure), when investment will be re­ 
turned, cash flow, present value of cash flow, ex­ 
pected rate of return, risk and many other factors. 
Their determination is based upon delineating R&D, 
operating, engineering, manufacturing and other 
costs and expenditures. It is also important, partic­ 
ularly in a new business venture based upon new 
technology and new services, to explicitly consider 
uncertainty and resulting risk [9,10]. Uncertainty 
refers to the subjective assessment of the vari­ 
ability (i.e., a probability density function) of basic 
parameters, such as the number of customers for a 
specific good or service as a function of time; and 
risk refers to the chance that various performance 
measures exceed different levels. In the following a 
specific measure of risk, the standard deviation of 
ROI, is considered.
Figure 2 illustrates the profit and cash flow compu­ 
tations, taking into account uncertainty in the input 
data—that is basic input parameters such as unit 
sales, selling price, market share, etc., are des­ 
cribed in the form of range of uncertainty and the
form of the uncertainty (i.e., probability density 
function). The profit, cash flow and other financial 
performance measures are therefore describable as 
probability distributions—a convenient form is that 
of the "risk profile" as indicated in Figure 2. The 
risk profiles (i.e., complement of the cumulative 
probability distribution) indicate the chance that the 
performance measure will exceed different levels.
To transform the uncertainty profiles into risk pro­ 
files requires the use of a financial simulation or 
risk analysis model. The concept of risk analysis—a 
formal procedure whereby quantitative estimates of 
uncertainty associated with basic input quantities 
are converted to risk profiles of performance 
measures—is illustrated in Figure 3. In the simpli­ 
fied model shown in Figure 3 revenue (in the I— 
time period) is equal to the product of unit sales, 
selling price and market share; before-tax profit is 
equal to revenue less the sum of all expense items 
less the depreciation expense; after-tax profit is one 
minus the tax rate multiplied by the bef ore-tax 
profit.
The risk analysis [9-12] is performed by random 
sampling of the input data (according to the weight­ 
ing of the uncertainty profiles), performing the 
computations contained within the simulation 
model, saving the results and thence repeating the 
process. This process is repeated a large number of 
times (Monte Carlo) until a reasonable set of histo­ 
grams can be developed from the saved output data. 
These histograms are thence manipulated into the 
desired form so as to indicate the variability of 
pertinent performance measures such as profit, 
cash flow, indebtedness (negative of the cumulative 
cash flow to date), rate of return and present worth. 
A convenient form, of displaying the performance 
measures is that of the "risk profiles" which
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FIGURE 3 . THE CONCEPT OF RISK ANALYSIS
the chance of the performance measure exceeding 
specific levels (i.e., the complement of the cumula­ 
tive probability distribution).
To establish the risk profiles, the uncertainty pro­ 
files associated with the basic input parameters 
must be established. Informed estimates need to be 
made of the ranges of uncertainty of key variables 
and their probability distributions within the ranges. 
The uncertainty assessments can be made by in­ 
dividuals, or they can be made by an experienced 
group of individuals using Delphi-type tech­ 
niques.
These uncertainty estimates are very subjective and 
so quantitatively express the attitudes regarding 
uncertainties—reflect past experience with similar 
efforts, typical problems encountered in the past, 
insights into problem areas which might develop, 
etc. The uncertainty profiles, being subjective 
estimates, call for expert opinion in each area. 
Manufacturing personnel should make the estimates 
of the uncertainty surrounding manufacturing cost; 
marketing personnel should make the estimates of 
the uncertainty surrounding the sales forecast and 
marketing costs; and so on in every category of 
input. Risk analysis demands detailed knowledge of 
the factors being evaluated!
A useful and frequently used procedure for estab­ 
lishing the shape of the uncertainty profile might be 
outlined as follows (see Figure 4):
A. Estimate the range of uncertainty—minimum 
and maximum bounds (little or no chance of 
falling outside these bounds). Divide this 
range into a number of equal intervals—five 
has been found, through experimentation, to 
be useful.
B. Make a relative ranking of the likelihood of 
the variable falling into each of the intervals; 
this establishes the general shape of the un­ 
certainty profile (i.e., skewed left, central, 
etc.).
C. Set relative values for the chance of falling 
into each interval. (For the Figure 4 case, the 
chance of falling into interval 1 is half that of 
falling into interval 2).
D. Having assumed the possibility of falling with­ 
in the range of uncertainty as 1.0, the chance 
of falling in each of the five intervals can be 
summed and set equal to unity. This equation 
can be solved (by substituting the relative 
values as obtained in paragraph C) for the 
probabilities associated with each interval.
This can become a long procedure when a large 
number of uncertainty variables and/or a large num­ 
ber of time intervals must be treated for which 
assessments have to be made. To minimize this 
problem, a large number of uncertainty profiles are 
stored in the computer and pictures of these shown
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to the evaluators. The evaluator then need specify 
only the minimum and maximum values and the 
name of the applicable uncertainty profile. If the 
appropriate uncertainty profile has not been stored, 
it can be created by the process just outlined.
Using the risk analysis technique, risk profiles may 
be developed for performance measures such as 
profit, cash flow, cumulative cash flow or indebted­ 
ness, payback period, return on assets, and return on 
investment. Figure 5 shows typical risk profiles of 
ROI. The vertical scale represents the probability 
(chance), p, of exceeding the various levels of ROI, 
indicated by the horizontal scale. In general, the 
steeper the curve, the lower the risk (or variability). 
When comparing alternatives, it is important to 
compare the expected or "most likely" ROI values. 
It is equally important to compare risk levels. (Note 
that, as per the central-limit theorem, the expected 
and "most likely" values of ROI are equal).
— ^ 10
RETURN ON INVESTMENT, ROI
FIGURE 5 TYPICAL RISK PROFILES OF RETURN 
ON INVESTMENT
Figure 3 illustrates the ROI risk profiles for hy­ 
pothetical alternatives, A or B. A decision maker 
performing a conventional analysis usually evaluates 
quantitatively on the "most likely" return on invest­ 
ment. To this uninformed decision maker, alterna­ 
tives A and B "look alike" because they show equal 
(p = .5) expected and "most likely" values.
In conventional analysis, the decision maker will try 
to pick the alternative yielding maximum ROI or 
other performance measure. In risk analysis the 
selection process is more difficult. Tradeoffs must 
be made between alternatives possessing different 
expected present values and associated levels of 
risk. When the risk dimension is added, the decision 
maker finds alternatives A and B in Figure 5, for 
instance, quite different. Alternative A assumes 
greater risk (variability) than Alternative B. Thus a 
conservative decision maker (averse to risk) would 
normally select B (if he does not feel other, un- 
quantified pressures to select alternative A).
The following paragraphs discuss the typical trade­ 
offs that are made with respect to risk (as measured 
by the variability or standard deviation of ROI), 
expected ROI, payback period and magnitude of the 
investment (i.e., exposure).
PRIVATE SECTOR INVESTMENT DECISIONS
In many instances the individual or group of indivi­ 
duals that is responsible for planning and evaluating 
a development, demonstration or incentive program 
does not have control of the investment decisions 
that must be made in order to capitalize upon this 
work. Yet in justifying the program it is necessary 
to establish a value for the program which derives 
from altering investment decisions that are beyond 
the planner's control. Since in the planning process 
it is not possible to know what future investment 
decisions will be with certainty, the future invest­ 
ment decisions can only be described and considered 
in terms of the likelihood or chance that they will 
be made. Thus, the XYZ Company considering a 
synfuel demonstration facility should not take it as 
a foregone conclusion that an operational facility 
will be implemented if the demonstration is a suc­ 
cess. The likelihood of a decision to implement an 
operational facility will be a function of pro forma 
performance measures such as annual profit, time of 
profitability, return on investment, payback period, 
magnitude of investment, risk and others. A 
government agency such as NASA considering dona­ 
ting a Space Shuttle flight as part of a joint 
endeavor agreement should not take as a foregone 
conclusion that the private sector will make addi­ 
tional investments necessary to establish an ongoing 
business venture. The value of the NASA program 
should consider the likelihood that the private 
sector will make these investments where the likeli­ 
hood is a function of pro forma performance 
measures such as profit, retun on investment, pay­ 
back period and others.
Important determinants of private sector invest­ 
ment have been found to be expected value, m, and 
variability (risk), a, of return on investment, ROI, 
expected payback period and expected exposure. To 
measure the functional relationship that exists in 
practice—the key to establishing the effect of risk 
and other financial performance measures on invest­ 
ment decisions—a survey of executives was con­ 
ducted under the auspices of the American Manage­ 
ment Associations [13]. Persons queried had the 
titles of Vice President, Finance; Controller; 
Treasurer or Director of Corporate Planning. The 
results of the survey are illustrated in Figures 6, 7 
and 8 where expected ROI, risk (i.e., the standard 
deviation of ROI), payback period and exposure (the 
ratio of the maximum funding required to the bud­ 
get of the decision makers).
Figure 6 illustrates the investment likelihood for the 
manufacturing sector. The specific set of curves is 
for a four year payback period and an investment 
that is between 1 and 10 percent of the capital 
budget. The scales are normalized to the firms1 cost 
of capital. Thus the vertical scale represents the 
expected ROI as a fraction of the cost of capital 
(1.0 indicates that the ROI is equal to the cost of 
capital). The horizontal scale represents the risk or 
standard deviation of ROI as a fraction of the cost 
of capital. The curves represent contours of equal
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likelihood or probability of investment. The line 
marked 0.8 indicates that those investments that 
are characterized by points (m, <r) that fall on this 
line have, a priori, an 80 percent chance of re­ 
ceiving funding. There is an 80 percent chance of 
an investment when the decision makers perceive an 
expected ROI that is 1.5 times the cost of capital 
and a level of risk (standard deviation of ROI) that 
is 0.2 times the cost of capital (see point B in 
Figure 6). Point A represents the expected ROI and 
standard deviation that would result in the absence 
of the development or demonstration program. 
Points B and C result from the pursuit of different 
development or demonstration programs. More will 
be said about this in following paragraphs.
Since all points that fall on the same contour have 
an equal chance of being funded, the contours 
indicate the general risk avoidance preferences of 
an industry sector.
Figures 7 and 8 summarize the investment likelihood 
in terms of magnitude of investment and payback 
period. It should be noted that there is a very 
definite rotation of the curves in terms of both 
investment magnitude and payback period. The 
rotation indicates the risk avoidance preferences in 
terms of payback period and investment magnitude, 
i.e., small expenditures and short payback period 
investments obviously have the highest likelihood of 
being funded. The curves indicate these risk- 
avoidance preferences quantitatively.
The significance of the investment likelihood curves 
as a function of financial performance measures can 
be grasped by noting that the expected benefits, B, 
from a public sector program undertaken to in­ 
fluence private sector investment decisions is given 
by
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B = <*B x NPVB - «A x NPVA - PVC
where NPVR and NPV, are the expected public 
sector net present value "of benefits with and with­ 
out the development, demonstration or incentive
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program respectively. The values of NPV. and 
NPVo can be determined using benefit-cost analysis 
to establish public sector benefits. PVC is the 
expected present value of the cost of the public 
sector program, a and a are the probabilities of 
private sector investment with and without the 
public sector program respectively as obtained from 
the investment likelihood curves. It is immediately 
apparent that the difference between <* and <* has 
a major effect on public sector benefits. It isalso 
evident (from Figure 6) that the value of a should 
not arbitrarily be taken as 1.0 with the public sector 
program and 0.0 without the public sector program. 
The appropriate value of a can only be established 
by planning and evaluating private sector business 
ventures explicitly taking into account quantitative 
estimates of uncertainty and the effect of the 
public sector program on these uncertainties. The 
overall evaluation procedure is summarized in 
Figure 9 where the assumed impact of the public 
sector program is a reduction of the uncertainty 
associated with sales.
To summarize, public sector development, demon­ 
stration and incentive programs are undertaken to 
1) reduce performance uncertainty, 2) reduce cost 
uncertainty, 3) reduce market uncertainty, and 
4) reduce private sector exposure (the maximum 
required investment as indicated by the peak of the 
indebtedness curve—see Figure 1). The impact on 
the private sector is through a reduction in private 
sector perceived risk and/or exposure with the in­ 
creased likelihood of the private sector developing 
and marketing beneficial goods and/or services. 
Risk analyses must be performed to obtain the 
financial performance measures that are necessary 
to establish the investment likelihood.
The typical effect of a demonstration program is 
illustrated in Figure 10 in terms of the performance 
measures previously defined. Figure 10A illustrates 
the effect of full investment, including the demon­ 
stration program, by the private sector. The degree 
of variability of exposure (maximum of the indebt­ 
edness curve), payback period and ROI is indicated. 
A large part of the variability is due to the un­ 
certainty of the cost and outcome of the demonstra­ 
tion program. Figure 10B illustrates the impact on 
the private sector of NASA undertaking the demon­ 
stration satellite program with no transfer payment 
from the private sector to NASA. Note that private 
sector exposure is reduced as is the variability of 
exposure, payback period and ROI. At the same 
time the expected ROI is increased. This is due to 
the uncertainty in the cost and outcome of the 
demonstration program being eliminated (private 
sector decisions can await the outcome of the NASA 
program) as well as the private sector demonstra­ 
tion program funding requirement being eliminated. 
Figure 10C indicates the impact of a NASA demon­ 
stration program when a payment is made to NASA 
from the private sector for using the resulting 
demonstration satellite in an operational system. 
The impact of the payment is to increase expected 
exposure and payback period and to reduce expected 
ROI. Note that there is no change (relative to
Figure 10B) in the variability of the performance 
measures. It is obvious that the business venture 
under scenario B is more desirable than under scen­ 
ario C, which is more desirable than under scen­ 
ario A. It is also obvious that the course of govern­ 
ment action can affect the likelihood of the private 
sector undertaking the hypothetical business ven­ 
ture. Since NASA benefits are a function of private 
sector investment decisions, NASA benefits will 
differ for each of the scenarios.
The impact of risk, expected ROI, payback and 
exposure is illustrated in Figure 6 in terms of the 
likelihood of private sector investment, a. The three 
alternatives shown in Figure 10 are indicated in 
Figure 6 as the previously discussed points A, B and 
C and demonstrate the role of the public sector in 
affecting private sector investment decisions 
through perceived risk reduction and shifting the 
burden of funding from the private to the public 
sector. It should be noted in passing that the effect 
of a recoupment policy (i.e., payback to NASA for 
service rendered) is to drive point B toward point C 
and thus reduce the likelihood of private sector 
investment. It is, of course, desirable for a govern­ 
ment agency to be paid for services rendered, but 
this must be tempered by its effect on total bene­ 
fits—the true objective is maximization of benefits.
SOME COMMERCIALIZATION ISSUES
The current Administration is placing increased em­ 
phasis on commercialization of space systems and 
technologies. This has led to government agencies, 
NASA and NOAA in particular, into a new are­ 
na—the planning and evaluation of private sector 
business ventures and the entering into joint en­ 
deavor or government/industry cooperative agree­ 
ments and the divestiture of government assets and 
capabilities to the private sector. Currently under 
consideration or in force are NASA/industry joint 
endeavor agreements concerning space processing 
ventures and a small low-earth orbiting platform 
business venture. Divestitures currently under con­ 
sideration includes the Delta, Atlas/Centaur and 
Space Shuttle Transportation systems and the earth 
observation and meteorological satellite systems. 
Each of the joint endeavors requires the partici­ 
pating government agency to provide a service or 
make a commitment such as a guarantee to utilize a 
product or service. This is undertaken with the 
objective of inducing the private sector to make 
investments that will lead to business ventures in 
the public interest—that is, to achieve benefits from 
the government programs. Divestitures are con­ 
sidered when the private sector is capable and 
interested in providing services that have previously 
been provided or developed by a government agency. 
This may or may not be accomplished more ef­ 
fectively by the private sector, but the private 
sector desires to try.
Turning attention to joint endeavor or cooperative 
agreements, it is the purpose of these agreements to
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effect private sector investment decisions through 
risk reduction and/or shifting the burden of funding 
from the private to the public sector. Using NASA 
as an example, NASA is normally expected to con­ 
tribute in the form of providing launch and related 
services with payment foregone or delayed, or to 
commit to the partaking of services or products to 
be offered by the private sector business venture. 
Note that the former contribution results in increas­ 
ing expected ROI, reducing payback period and 
reducing the exposure by shifting the burden of 
funding from the private to the public sector. The 
latter contribution results primarily in reducing per­ 
ceived risk by reducing market uncertainties.
There are many questions that should be answered 
concerning proposed joint venture agreements 
among which are the following. Does the con­ 
templated private sector business venture (that will 
result from the agreement) make financial sense 
without the NASA commitment? With the NASA 
commitment? What is the chance that the private 
sector will initiate the business venture without the 
NASA investment? With the NASA investment? 
Does the change in the investment likelihood war­ 
rant the commitment requested of NASA? Are the 
resulting benefits to NASA worth the NASA "invest­ 
ment"? In order to answer these types of questions 
it is often necessary to perform an independent 
assessment of the proposed business ventures. This 
entails, in some cases, independent market assess­ 
ments and sales forecasts and the formulation of a 
business venture including estimates of revenues, 
expenses, costs and capital expenditures. A typical 
assessment of a proposed joint endeavor agreement
concerning a low-earth-orbiting spacecraft business 
venture such as LEASECRAFT [5] is illustrated in 
Figure 11. The objective of such analyses are to 
establish NASA negotiating position with respect to 
what it can afford (as well as the form) to give up in 
order to effect the proposed venture. For example, 
a hypothetical situation is shown in Figure 12 and 
illustrates the effect of a donated Space Shuttle 
flight and guarantee to limited purchase of ser­ 
vices—the former effects expected ROI and the 
latter effects perceived risk. In the hypothetical 
example both yield a .50 percent chance of private 
sector investment but the former is accompanied by 
a cost. The latter situation is therefore preferred.
As already pointed out many divestiture situations 
are developing. However there are not many exam­ 
ples in the U.S. of the planned divestiture of public 
sector capabilities to the private sector. In the 
private sector a divestiture often represents an 
attempt to improve cash flow or to realign cor­ 
porate capabilities with new business objectives. In 
the case of the public sector divestiture, it is 
important to understand and quantify the benefits to 
the public of the proposed transfer. Moreover, in 
some cases the government will corrtinue (at least 
for some period of time) to purchase some part of 
the services provided by the new private sector 
venture. For example, in the event of the divesti­ 
ture of weather or earth observation space systems, 
the government would undoubtedly be a major pur­ 
chaser of data products.
Again using NASA as an example, proposals are 
currently evolving by the private sector to com­ 
mercialize various aspects of the Space Shuttle
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Transportation System as well as the expendable 
launch vechiles (ELY). These proposals are likely to 
suggest that NASA facilities and/or people be trans­ 
ferred to or perform services for the proposed 
ventures. What should NASA be paid for lease or 
transfer of facilities, people and/or services? What 
will be the pricing policy of the proposed venture 
and what effect will it have on the cost of NASA 
missions? What effect will the pricing policy (for 
example, a commercialized Delta launch vehicle) 
have on the utilization and hence the pricing of the 
Space Shuttle? What happens if the business ven­ 
ture (i.e., the commercialized launch vehicles) is not 
profitable? Is the transportation capability lost, or 
is there an implied NASA guarantee for continuity 
of service? If failure of the business venture is due 
to competitive forces, does this imply the lack of 
need for the specific launch vehicles? Will private 
sector goals and objectives be similar to those of 
NASA (this is extremely important if the divestiture 
is not of the complete system)? If not, what 
problems are likely to arise?
In order to answer questions such as these, govern­ 
ment agencies must perform analyses such as in­ 
dicated in Figure 13. At the heart of this is a 
financial analysis of the proposed business venture. 
The financial analysis, if performed parametrically 
in terms of pricing policies and recoupment polices, 
can shed light on the government agencies1 appro­ 
priate negotiating positions.
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The subject of commercialization cannot be closed 
without a comment on government subsidization. 
Irrespective of a common belief there is indeed a 
place for subsidization if the subsidization will alter 
private sector investment decisions to initiate busi­ 
ness ventures that will produce public or societal 
benefits that exceed the cost of the subsidization. 
Subsidization has a place when a pricing mechanism 
does not exist for the services rendered. For 
example, consider the provision of improved emer­ 
gency medical communications services via satel­ 
lite. It has been shown that thousands of trauma 
victims lives could be saved annually from improved 
EMS communications—this, if converted to a dollar 
value, is equivalent to many hundreds of millions of 
dollars per year. A commercial business venture to 
provide these services would, however, have revenue 
based upon the number of telephone calls, their 
duration and price. In short there is no viable 
pricing mechanism that can be related to the value 
of a human life saved as a result of the improved 
EMS communications. Thus large societal benefits 
have been foregone because the private sector has 
not found a mechanism to provide profitable EMS 
communciatiosn services—it is possible that subsidi­ 
zation could alter this.
SUMMARY
exposure. This quantitative data is the link between 
public sector actions and private sector investment 
decisions.
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